

CaL2019
Cognition and Lying
book of abstracts

BRAK

28–30 November
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Brno

Welcome!

We are happy to welcome you to the conference, CaL2019: Cognition and Lying.

CaL2019 follows the previous conference, CaL2017 (Cognition and Language), in its effort to show how cognitive science can endorse traditional philosophical topics. This time, the topic at hand is lying and deception – ubiquitous phenomenon, interesting not only in its moral controversy but also in its persistent presence in our everyday lives. CaL2019 tries to present a variety of possible approaches to this topic, from philosophical to psychological and neuroscientific.

We wish you a **trully** good time.

CaL2019 is organized by BRAK (Brno Analytic Circle) in cooperation with the Department of Philosophy and Faculty of Arts at Masaryk University.

Organizations: BRAK z. s., Faculty of Arts (Masaryk University), Department of Philosophy (Faculty of Arts, Masaryk University).

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Invited Lecture

Thursday 16:30 - 17.30

Is Lying the Worst Kind of Deception?

James Edwin Mahon

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Aula

Thursday 16:30 - 17.30

In the talk, I will argue that on the account of lying that I will defend, according to which lying involves an attempt to deceive by means of a betrayal of trust, lying is the (morally) worst kind of deception. In so doing, I will explain why the traditional definition of lying failed to capture the invocation and betrayal of trust that is constitutive of lying, and hence needed to be revised, and I will defend the position that lying is morally worse than other forms of intended deception, all things being equal, against those who would argue that it is merely morally equivalent to other kinds of deception, all things being equal.

Abstracts

Thursday 17:45 - 18.55

Lying and Deception

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Aula

Thursday 17:45 - 18.15

Lying is a familiar and important moral phenomenon that affects us on an everyday basis. Dishonest communication can have dramatic effects: recent, blatant examples are the false promises that supported the Brexit campaign, and the falsehoods that helped Donald Trump to get into the Oval office. Given the significance of dishonest speech, it is not surprising that disciplines as diverse as sociology, linguistics, and psychology have displayed an increasing interest in its analysis. One fundamental philosophical question that cuts across these disciplines concerns how to define and characterise lying, sincerity and other concepts that apply to dishonest communication. In the last 20 years, the philosophical literature has focused especially on the question of how to define lying. Lies come in a variety of forms and kinds, and this is part of what makes them elusive and difficult to identify. As Montaigne nicely stated, while truth is unique, "the opposite of truth has many shapes, and an indefinite field" (Essays, I.IX}. There is a whole grey area of deceptive utterances that are difficult to classify and, quite importantly, it is in this grey zone that liars strive. To shed some light in this obscure area, this paper considers the problem of classifying statements that are neither fully believed to be false, nor fully believed to be true. In

the public debate, it is not uncommon for politicians to be caught making statements of this kind. For instance¹ when in 2003 George W. Bush claimed that Iraq possessed weapon of mass destruction, he had very little evidence for his claim - arguably, he was neither sure that it was false, nor sure that it was true (cf. Carson 2010}. Are statements uttered in such conditions of uncertainty lies? And how much confidence in their falsity is required for them to count as lies? To characterise these statements, I will present a definition of lying according to which you lie only if you make a statement that you believe more likely to be false than true (Marsili 2014). From this definition, it follows that the more confident you are in the falsity of what you are saying, the more your utterance is insincere. This provides a criterion for the moral evaluation of lying: the wrongness of a lie can be understood as a function of the extent to which a speaker violates a sincerity norm. However, political speech often aims to deceive without explicitly lying. In the concluding remarks of the paper, I will sketch a tentative extension of my analysis to the deceptive intents of speakers. I propose a model to understand the moral wrongness of attempted deception in a way that parallels my proposed understanding of insincerity: as a function of the extent to which it aims to direct someone's degree of confidence away from the truth. The resulting picture provides a unified model of what it means to be insincere and to be deceptive, and of what is morally wrong about linguistic dishonesty.

What do we research when researching a lie?

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Aula

Thursday 17:45 - 18.15

Lying is a phenomenon that is attended by a wide range of disciplines. There is no wonder that – lying is a common activity with significant practical, moral and legal consequences. The urgency of researching this phenomenon is illustrated, for example, by the continuous pursuit of an effective method of lie detection: On the one hand, we have an evident and easily understandable demand for this method, on the other hand, we are confronted with the persistent failure that accompanies this effort. Therefore, it is clear that research of lying is for decades addressed by such disciplines as psychology and neurosciences. The question arises: If there is so much interest in the research of lying and if that research has consumed so many resources, how is it that the results are still so modest, unreliable and sometimes mutually exclusive?

The paper *What do we research when researching a lie?* will try to seek the answer from a philosophical point of view. It will try to argue that the modest results of lying research are mainly due to the fact that the object of this research is not well-defined – it is not clear what exactly can be considered a lie. This will be illustrated on several studies. The definition of the lie relies on mere stipulation without proper consideration. However, the stipulation of definition determines the results of the research and furthermore prevents its generalization, thus limiting its usefulness in empirical research. Scientific efforts to address lying will show how difficult it is to try to base the definition on something other than such stipulation. The question arises how far it is actually possible to investigate lying by other than conceptual methods and whether

the nature of the phenomenon is not too complicated for meeting the ambitions set for empirical research.

Preventing Cancer: Organizational Lying, Bullshitting, and Deceiving

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Aula
Thursday 17:45 - 18.15

“Our product can prevent cancer,” “You will be fit and healthy without any effort,” “We did react swiftly,” “We do consider our customers first,” these are just some general examples of problematic statements made by organizations in their advertising or communication towards a public audience.

Similar statements were labeled as lies made by organizations. In some cases, organizations were fined, and it was forbidden for them to use these statements further. Organizations also tried in several instances to dismiss accusations of lying as misunderstandings or re-labeled given communications as unsuccessful campaigns. Many experts consider honesty as the primary principle of organizational communication to the public; some of them even directly say to managers: do not lie! Thus, what is a lie in the organizational context? How to define a lying done by an organization?

The definition of lying usually deals with a person as a human individual. However, an organization can be seen as a person too. It has its rights and duties. It also poses knowledge and behaves in a certain way as a social player. In this manner, organizations also communicate, and it might use deceptive strategies regarding its stakeholders. Thus, questions arise: Are today’s approaches to lying and bullshitting applicable to lying and bullshitting done by an organization? How can we distinguish between a lying organization and a lying member of an organization? What conditions have to be met to determine that an organization is lying?

To answer these questions, I will use concepts of organizational intentions and organizational knowledge. I will show that it is possible to sufficiently determine when an organization is involved in deceptive strategies, lying or bullshitting. This determination might be done even when a member of an organization who communicates a message does not have any knowledge about the truthfulness of the message and does not have control over it.

Friday 10:00 - 11.30

Political Lies and the Right to the Truth

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A11

Friday 10:00 - 10.30

Over the last decades, transitional societies have used the Right to the Truth as a very important tool to deal with their recent past of massive human rights violations and heinous crimes. After the creation of the first successful truth commission in Argentina, in 1983, more than thirty commissions have been established to rescue the truth from deniers and oblivion. The Economic and Social Council of the UN recognized the right to the truth in the *Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights* and, among others, in the *Principles for the Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees*. In the same way, the UN General Assembly proclaimed 24 March as the International Day for the Right to the Truth.

In this paper, I analyze the effects of political lies on the right to the truth. By reconstructing the history of the right to the truth, and analyzing its particular legal structure, I claim that by contrast with traditional human rights, the right to the truth does not legitimize the power of states by granting them the protection of some basic goods. Instead, it not only creates a healthy distrust toward States and political institutions, but also empowers minorities to form transnational pressure groups that are effective resisting political violence. The right to the truth works as a canary in the mine; it warns us when terrible human rights violations are about to happen. This alert has the power to attract people from around the

world to help specially those who are the target of state violence. For this reason, I conclude, political lies specially affect the rights of the most vulnerable people and pave the way for serious violations of human rights.

The Will to Believe: Demand for Bullshit in the Post-Truth World

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Friday 10:30 - 11.00

If the post-truth era were to have a slogan, it would be a quote by Julius Caesar: “Men readily believe what they want to believe.” Disregarding Caesar’s, or rather his translator’s, unduly gendered language, the saying addresses a timeless feature of the human condition whose significance is often neglected in the debates enveloping the allegedly recent phenomenon of ‘fake news.’ The main claim I want to put forward is that the commonplace supply-side explanations which lay the blame for the current crisis of liberal democracies squarely on mischievous bullshit peddlers are desperately inadequate. One has no hope to understand the contemporary political developments unless she admits the lead role demand has to play. The fact is, we love our fake news.

For a long time, beliefs were treated as a simple derivative of available information, at least in economics. Within his limited means, any rational agent was supposed to strive for the truth because false beliefs lead to costly mistakes. It was the pathbreaking work by Caplan (2000; 2008) that modified the standard view. His theory of rational irrationality which converges with the psychological findings regarding motivated reasoning (Kahan 2016) offers clues to disentangle the post-truth politics. Where we, humans, do not receive prompt and palpable feedback in terms of success or failure of our actions, our beliefs converge not to the most realistic model of the world but to the most pleasing one. This bliss point tends to be located in convenient proximity of our tribal identity, be it

established on whatever ideological or sociological grounds (Achen and Bartels 2016).

Much has been said about the sinister power of manipulation that can be exercised through social networks and search engines. From the perspective of the demand-based explanations of the post-truth era, this threat is likely overstated. Digital networks are more tools that enable easier satisfaction of our desire to believe what we want to believe than puppet masters who control the consciousness of the masses. As such, their role in the current political turmoil is more one of a catalyst than a culprit. In any case, the information revolution they brought about cannot be unmade. We can only look ahead. Related to the recent analysis by Gurri (2018), I will discuss what implications our penchant for fake news may have with respect to the future of liberal democracies.

What if the expert lies? How to reveal a lying expert

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Friday 11:00 - 11:30

In my presentation, I focus on the argumentation theory and its connection to the phenomenon of lying (the traditional definition of lying is being used). To be more precise, I will be discussing the problems of *Arguments from expert opinion* and the following question: Can we reveal a lying expert and how to do it?

To begin with, I present a definition of *Argument from expert opinion* based on Douglas Walton's theory. It is necessary to distinguish between the terms of *authority* (the Latin expression *ad verecundiam* is traditionally used) and *expert*, as their institutional and epistemic notion tends to be confused. Then it will be shown that the *expert* has a prominent (not only epistemic) position in argumentation (in both institutional and epistemic approach), and for this reason he is also in a very good position to commit a lie. Furthermore, the *expert* does often not participate in argumentation, he is only mentioned as a support (*warrant*) of used premises. In such cases, a lie is commonly committed by an arguing *layperson*. We must take this discrepancy into consideration. Walton's dialogical notion of argumentation needs to be explained. According to Walton, arguments can be evaluated by *Critical questions* which challenge the parts of arguments that tend to be faulty.

In the main part of my presentation, I show Walton's *Critical questions* related to *Argument from expert opinion*, especially such that should help us reveal a lying *expert*. The reliability of an *expert* can be challenged in many ways. Walton defines a group of

questions aiming the trustworthiness of an expert. We can look at the *expert's* honesty, trustworthiness, character, etc. Unfortunately, these concepts are transformed to vague concept of *bias*, which is a subject of study of other sciences than argumentation theories. Despite this fact, we can challenge the *expert* using *Critical questions*. I argue that it seems more effective to ask other *Critical questions* than those aiming trustworthiness. I will show ways how to question the *expert* and *layperson* as well. It follows that the group of questions concerning trustworthiness is not as useful as the rest of them. Obviously, there are ways how to reveal a lying *expert*.

Friday 13:00 - 14.30

Did Theresa May Lie?

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A11

Friday 13:00 - 13.30

In this paper, I argue that asserting what you confidently believe is false is not a necessary condition of lying. There are situations in which a speaker can assert what they believe is false, and even intend to thereby make their hearer believe their assertion, without actually lying to the hearer.

One such situation might be involving Theresa May's motivated reasoning regarding a no-deal Brexit. May dismissed concerns raised by her finance minister and the Treasury about the UK leaving the EU without a deal, saying that 'a no-deal Brexit will be fine'. Surely, she must in some sense know that the Treasury is not lying to her and we can easily imagine that, on reflection, she would even acknowledge this. Nonetheless, this is not enough for her to change her mind as she still seems to believe that a no-deal Brexit will be fine, say with very high confidence (0.8 on a scale of 0–1). Is May lying by asserting 'A no-deal Brexit will be fine' to the public? A natural response is that she is not, since she asserts what she confidently believes is true. But, let us suppose that May comes to think that, even though she cannot help herself believing that a no-deal Brexit will be fine, there is a much higher chance that the experts are right, not her. Say that this realisation lowers her credence in 'A no-deal Brexit will be fine' proposition only from 1 to 0.8, but that, because of this realisation, she asserts to her friends in confidentiality 'A no-deal Brexit will have large fiscal consequences' – a

proposition she still consciously believes to be false with confidence of 0.8. Is May lying now? I think that the answer is ‘no’ but none of the received views will give this answer.

Even more, in some situations, asserting what the speaker consciously and confidently believes is true, even while actively intending to make the hearer believe what the asserter says, should – believe it or not – actually count as lying to the hearer.

Let us plausibly say that at least some delusions are beliefs. Let us also, based on real cases, plausibly imagine that some delusional patients can know that their thoughts are false while being incapable of revising them immediately; they believe that p while realising that their belief that p is false. Let us thus plausibly imagine that one delusional patient (1) delusionally believes that p and (2) he knows that he is delusional and that his delusion is false, but that he (3) fails to revise his delusion immediately – though his credence in the proposition p decreases from 0.9 to 0.8. If it is possible for this man to briefly realise that his delusion is false while nonetheless still delusionally believing his delusional thought that p with confidence 0.8, is he lying by asserting that p (a proposition he confidently believes is false)? Say that he even wants to make his hearer believe that p . I think that the answer is ‘no,’ since this man knows that his belief that p is a delusional, false belief. Say now that this man asserts that p , which is what he delusionally believes is true, to his hearer, intending to thereby make the hearer believe that p . While he genuinely believes that p , he knows that this belief is delusional and, I argue, this suggests that one may lie by asserting what one believes is true.

The existence of these cases suggests that the standard approach to lying should be abandoned. This is a very radical proposal but it does not seem to be unjustified.

Self-Deception as Cognitive Disorientation

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Friday 13:30 - 14.00

Self-deceptive and non-self-deceptive inquirers typically have something in common: they work hard for what it is they come to believe—reflective inquiry is demanding of time, energy, and attention. What is less clear is what they share when it comes to a characterization of how they come to believe as they do. A familiar view, intentionalism, has it that the process of self-deception is mediated by some self-deceptive intention. In this way, such a view takes seriously an interpersonal model of deception; the self-deceiver, it is alleged, is trying to deceive herself, trying to bias her cognition in the direction of p -belief, or trying to come to believe that p .

There's no doubt that many characteristics of a self-deceiver's cognitive behavior make plausible the claim that the self-deceiver and the typical inquirer have different aims: the self-deceiver's persistent efforts to confirm favored hypotheses; her apparent asymmetric acceptance and rejection thresholds for doxastic embrace and rejection of various propositions; her alternately strikingly credulous and strikingly critical stances. An attractive diagnosis of this behavior is that the self-deceiver displays and exercises the sort of control characteristic of goal-directed, intentional activity. In this way, we think, self-deceivers are not trying to settle a question of the form " p or not- p ?" Rather they're trying to come to believe some particular, favored proposition.

I aim to explain these distinctive features of self-deception in a way consistent with deflationary accounts of self-deception, according to which the process of self-deception is a process of motivationally biased inquiry and belief-formation. The self-deceiver is, I'll

argue, cognitively disoriented. In cognitive disorientation, the data or experiences upon which we typically rely during inquiry come to mislead us in systematic fashion. The cognitively disorientated self-deceiver holds a reflective aim—the aim of settling a settling a question—and organizes her activities with an eye towards realizing that aim; in fact, her activities serve to undermine her own efforts. This is how, in the midst of self-deceptive inquiry, the self-deceiver takes herself to be engaged in the same task she carries out when settling questions aptly.

Drawing on the analogy of spatial disorientation, I characterize two elements of cognitive disorientation: Confusion of Aim and Misleading Feedback. The shape Confusion of Aim and Misleading Feedback take in self-deceptive inquiry is this: while the self-deceiver organizes her activities—the activities constitutive of inquiry—with an eye to realizing her reflective aim of settling a question, that aim is unwittingly confused with another: the doxastic embrace of some favored proposition. This is the result of the fact that, as I'll discuss below, the self-deceiver's psychological constitution is such that the feedback she receives and by which she guides and adjusts her reflective effort to settle her question misleads her towards, e.g., the belief that *p*. She is cognitively disoriented. I devote considerable attention to the development of an account of the relevant form of Misleading Feedback by appeal to the theory of cognitive dissonance. Crucial to the account is that a self-deceiver is misled by a signal that mimics one by which the typical inquirer steers aptly. Finally, I end by considering a number of objections to my account and by offering (the beginnings of) a rejoinder to a challenge to deflationary accounts of self-deception posed by a currently noteworthy competing family of non-doxastic (or not robustly doxastic) accounts of the phenomenon of self-deception.

Framing Deceptive Dynamics in Terms of Abductive Cognition

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Friday 14:00 - 14.30

I intend to expand the analysis of deception by linking it to abductive or hypothetical reasoning. More specifically, I will propose an analysis of deception as the activity of intentionally misleading other agents' hypothetical inferences. I will claim that to understand deception in this way has the advantages of clarifying the epistemological and psychological dynamics involved in deception. Indeed, if deception can be framed as the intentional manipulation of others' hypothetical inferences so that they will accept the false or disadvantageous hypothesis as common ground, then a better understanding of the epistemological and cognitive dynamics involved in deception will emerge by clarifying how abduction works. For example, I will claim that criteria for drawing sound hypotheses, such as relevance and coherence with background-knowledge, can be exploited in order to deceive.

Tracing it back to Peirce's analysis, I will focus on recent Agent-Based view of abduction (Bertolotti 2015; Gabbay & Woods 2005; Magnani 2009; Shanahan 2010; Woods 2013), which stresses the inherent multimodality of abductive cognition, presents it as a sense-making perceptual activity necessary to face environmental volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity and offers a realistic description of the reasoners' capabilities and their scant resources, both internal (computational power) and external (time and information available). According to this view, abductive cognition is economic, quick and often reliable, enabling the agent to

form meaningful representations of reality, while at the same time, being non truth-preserving, it can lead to errors.

To support and substantiate my thesis, I will examine some works on military deception (Jones 1981; Whaley 2007; Clark & Mitchell 2019). Since these works address a public composed by intelligence analysts, operations planners and decision-makers, they are focused on teaching how to achieve effective deceptions and conversely how to avoid being deceived. They present an abundance of case-studies and analyses thereof that can serve to show the role and dynamics of abductive cognition in deception.

In particular, I will concentrate my attention on the psychology of intelligence analysis (Heuer 1999; Puvathingal & Hantula 2011) where counterdeception is explicitly treated as a problem of choosing between competing hypothesis based on evidences, some of which could be unreliable and intentionally displayed to deceive. I will conclude by remarking the advantages of the thesis here presented to better understand the epistemological dynamics of deception and by highlighting the questions it leaves open for further investigations.

Friday 15:00 - 16.30 – Skype Session

Lying and Bullshit

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A11, Skype
Friday 15:00 - 15.30

To the best of my knowledge the best and final word on the subject of bullshit remains Harry Frankfurt’s seminal and aptly named essay “On Bullshit.” It not only provides an account of bullshit, but also serves to warn us of its dangers; as he puts it, bullshit is an even “greater enemy of truth [than lying].” In this paper I will argue that Frankfurt is wrong on both accounts. Although bullshit is both pervasive and problematic, the theory he offers simply cannot be correct. Simply put, there’s no such thing as Frankfurt bullshit. More specifically, I argue that the core distinction between the liar and the bullshitter, on which the entire theory hangs is unsustainable—when fleshed out it either makes the bullshitter a kind of anarchic speaker, makes bullshit exceedingly rare, or makes lying exceedingly rare. Since all three of these options are unacceptable, I claim the distinction should be thrown out and the theory rejected.

I begin with a summary of Frankfurt’s theory based on two important distinctions (section I, part a), and offers the best way to understand the view (section I, part b). Then, I explain how this view faces some insurmountable problems (section II) before offering my own account of bullshit that avoids the problems proposed (section III). I close out by considering why it’s still reasonable to take issue with bullshit even if it is not the great enemy of truth that Frankfurt claims it is (section IV).

Lies, assertions and manipulations: between inferentialism and development

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Friday 15:30 - 16.00

In this talk, I am following up on a discussion initiated by Mark Jary in “Lying and Assertion”, in order to revise the definition of lying, the connection between lying and entailment (from Brandom’s perspective on the way assertion works), and how the latter links with manipulation. In this talk, I particularly suggest that from the point of view of the concept of entailment, the consequences of a manipulative complex verbal behavior are to be considered as the core of any generalized deceptive act. In order to make this proposal robust, I retake (Santibáñez, 2017) some of my earlier efforts to distinguish the features of an axiology of deception, and to characterize the distinctions between different verbal behaviors in which deception is at work. To achieve this, I will discuss the link between lying and assertion, assertion and belief, and special focus will be given to Brandom’s account of the inferential functioning of assertions, in which commitments and entailment are the main concepts to be considered.

Breaking the Tension in Self-Deception

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A11, Skype

Friday 16:00 - 16.30

Philosophical accounts of self-deception generally fall within one of two categories. The first category, *intentionalism*, describes the nature of self-deception in terms of intentions. According to these accounts, self-deception occurs only when a person intentionally deceives herself. However, intentionalist accounts struggle to solve several much-discussed paradoxes about self-deception. For example, intentionalism seems to require impossible mental states from the self-deceiver, who is both the deceiver and the deceived (Nelkin 2002: 386). Because of this struggle, *motivationism* has taken over as the orthodox way to understand self-deception.

According to motivationism, certain motivational biases play a causal role in the production of self-deceptive beliefs (see e.g., Mele 2001). Although motivationism avoids the paradoxes that intentionalism encounters, many critics have argued that motivationism is simply too deflationary. In particular, motivationist accounts have been targeted for their inability to explain the cognitive *tension* that seems inherent to self-deception. Although this tension has been characterized in many different ways, most theorists seem to have roughly the same idea in mind. For example, Michael Losonsky argues that a “conflicted mental life is an important key to understanding the structure of real self-deception” (Losonsky 1997: 122). Similarly, George Graham describes self-deception as having cognitive discomfort instantiated by “doubts, qualms, suspicions, misgivings, and the like” (Graham 1986: 226). Similar characterizations

have been made by Eric Funkhouser (2005), Kent Bach (1997), Paul Noordhof (2009), Neil Van Leeuwen (2008), and many others.

Motivationists and intentionalists alike have largely accepted the terms of this “tension challenge.” Intentionalists appear to have an advantage since tension is a crucial ingredient in these accounts (e.g., Davidson 1986; Bermúdez 2003). But motivationists have repeatedly attempted to work tension into their respective motivationist frameworks, and judged it to be a crucial fault when an account cannot adequately do so (e.g., Audi 1997; Funkhouser 2005; Lynch 2012).

We argue that the tension challenge is fundamentally misguided: tension is not a necessary component of self-deception. To show this, we constructed five test cases where a protagonist appears to be self-deceived despite lacking tension. An example: participants were told about Eric, who submitted an essay to a competition. It lost. Although Eric received feedback from reviewers, he thought that they failed to understand his complex ideas and wrongly rejected his paper. But any reasonable person would have seen that it was correctly rejected. In this case, there is no cognitive tension.

We also created five counterpart cases to serve as controls. For instance, the control version of the Eric case was similar to the case described above, except that Eric took the criticism of the referees seriously. He fully accepted their decision to reject his paper.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of five test cases and one of five control cases. In addition to asking whether the protagonist in the case was self-deceived, we also included a question to assess whether people did indeed view the case as not featuring any tension in the agent.

In every test case—where there was no tension—people overwhelmingly agreed that there was no tension. Yet, self-deception ratings exceeded 90% in every case. In contrast, in the control cases, self-deception ratings were between 17% and 38%. This is

not at all what we would expect if tension were necessary for self-deception. Our findings thus undermine the claim that tension is necessary for self-deception. At the very least, we have shown that an account's inability to meet the tension challenge is not clearly a reason to reject that account. Since intentionalist accounts face far worse problems, motivationism seems to be better equipped than intentionalism to successfully capture the concept of self-deception.

Friday 17:00 - 18.30

Perception of Lying by Indonesians

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A11

Friday 17:00 - 17.30

Theoretical background. Coleman & Kay (1981) proposed a prototype semantics analysis of the English word lie claiming that a *lie* contains three elements, namely factual falsity, belief and intention. According to Coleman & Kay, lacking one or more element will still be considered a lie but to a lesser degree. Their study has been replicated by Cole (1996) with Arabic speakers, Hardin (2010) with Ecuadorian Spanish speakers, and Eichelberger (2012) with Spanish speakers in Madrid, where they found that speakers of the languages at stake perceive belief as the most important element of a prototypical lie, similarly to English speakers. However, both groups of Spanish speakers put intention as the least constituting element of a prototypical lie since lying is also used as a common cultural tool for politeness. A different result was obtained by Vajtai (2013). According to his research, Hungarians believe that the main element of lying is the intention.

Aim. Since there has been no study about perception of lying among Indonesians, the present study wants to explore this topic. The research questions addressed are as follows (1) Does the Indonesian word *lie* consist of the Coleman & Kay's prototype elements? (2) What is the most important element according to Indonesians? and (3) Do Indonesians demonstrate the same interpretation of situation in which lie occurs.

Research and methodology. The study reported on in the present paper replicated Coleman & Kay's questionnaire consisting eight stories based on permutation of the three prototypical elements. Two of the stories were controlling questions. Respondents wrongly answering these controlling questions were discarded from the analysis. Respondents were also given chance to provide comments about their choices. However, the comments were not taken into consideration for the analysis. They were only used to find details about any cultural reasons of the respondents' choice. Coleman & Kay also proposed a scoring method to evoke a scale of the degree of condition of lying and certainty that the participants had; 7 is a very sure lie, 6 a fairly sure lie, 5 unsure lie, 4 uncertain, 3 an unsure non-lie, 2 a fairly sure non-lie, and 1 being a very sure non-lie. Stories evaluated closely to the high score are considered to contain the most prototypical lie.

Results. 120 native Indonesians respondents took part in the study but 18 of them were not included into the analysis because of their wrong answers to the controlling questions. The results reveal that stories with falsity have higher scores. Differently from speakers in other cultures, Indonesians seem to disregard the intention or belief of the speakers in the stories. Indonesians also mentioned rarely belief as an element of lying proving that not all elements suggested by Coleman & Kay (1981) are present in the Indonesian data. The result demonstrates that Indonesians have different conceptions about what a lie is.

Experimental deception: Science, performance, and reproducibility

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A11

Friday 17:30 - 18.00

Much of the commentary on experimental deception has focused on whether or not it is ethically justifiable (e.g., Baumrind, 1964; Kellman, 1967; Nicks, Korn, and Mainieri, 1997; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2008). On the other hand its potential impact on reproducible science has not been examined with any seriousness. This is evident in the fact that no comprehensive theoretical treatment of experimental deception as a technique in behavioral studies (outside of ethical concerns) exists. I demonstrate, using data from the Open Science Collaboration's Reproducibility Project (2015), that experiments involving deception have a higher probability of not replicating and have smaller effect sizes compared to experiments that do not have deception procedures. This trend is possibly due to missing information about the context and performance of agents in the studies in which the original effects were generated, leading to either compromised internal validity, or an incomplete specification and control of variables in replication studies. Of special interest are the mechanisms by which deceptions are implemented and how these present challenges for the efficient transmission of critical information from experimenter to participant. Motivated by these observations, I go on to rehearse possible frameworks that might form the basis of a future research program on experimental deception. I draw on disciplines that already have coherent treatments of performance and communication such as the ethological study of signaling, the sociology of impression formation and management, and the psychology of illusions and magic performance. Although very preliminary, my

theoretical sketch attempts to identify important issues that will need to be addressed by such a research program, such as the effective detection of participant suspicion and the development of a taxonomy of technical features of experiments that facilitate or hamper deception. More generally, I invite philosophers of science and social scientists to take a renewed interest in their experimental colleagues and their laboratories for the sake of improving psychological science.

Using Ocular-Motor Method to Detect Deception

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A11

Friday 18:00 - 18.30

Several government agencies and private companies routinely conduct credibility assessments to test job applicants and screen current employees. In many countries, criminal investigations also have an option to use a polygraph examination of the suspects. The polygraph is the most widely used method of credibility assessment. However, there is several criticisms toward polygraph examination, especially its use for pre-employment screening. More recently, a cognitive approach to detecting deception became relevant. The notion is that lying (here considered an attempt to convince someone else of something the liar believes is not true, it is the unexpressed intention of the liar to mislead) requires more cognitive effort than telling the truth suggested that the right question to ask when we try to reveal deception in practice might not be “Is the person lying?”. As stated above, lying is cognitively more demanding than truth-telling, therefore, we need to consider asking “How hard is the person thinking?” instead. Research has shown that changes in pupil diameter (PD) are reliable and valid indicators of cognitive effort and emotional arousal, and most theories of deception detection posit that deception is cognitively more demanding than telling the truth. In addition, cognitive scientists who use eye tracking technology to study the psychology of reading have identified number of measures of reading behavior that reflect cognitive effort. Consistent with prior psychophysiological research on the detection of deception and the psychology of reading, PD and reading measures have been found to discriminate between truthful and deceptive individuals who read and respond to statements concerning their possible

involvement in a mock crime.

The Ocular-Motor Deception (ODT) test has been first presented a decade earlier by a team of scientists from the University of Utah. The ODT evaluates pupillary responses and reading behavior that occur while a person reads and responds to statements about their possible involvement in a mock-crime. This method has the potential to substitute polygraph examinations in security screenings as it is fast, non-intrusive and relies on cognitive indicators of deception rather than solely on physiological indicators of sympathetic activation. The results indicate that the standard protocol in mock crime experiments yield about 80-85% classification accuracy.

Timetable

date	place	beginning	end	
28.11.2019	Aula	16:30	17:30	James Edwin Mahon: Is Lying the Worst Kind of Deception?
		17:30	17:45	Pause
		17:45	18:15	Neri Marsili: Lying and Deception
		18:15	18:35	Michal Stránský:
		18:35	18:55	Tomáš Ondraček:
29.11.2019	Faculty Cafeteria A11	19:30	21:00	Welcoming Reception
		9:30	10:00	Cofee
		10:00	10:30	Political Lies and the Right to the Truth The Will to Believe: Demand for Bullshit in the Post-Truth World What if the expert lies? How to reveal a lying expert.
		10:30	11:00	Lunch
		11:00	11:30	Did Theresa May Lie? Self-Deception as Cognitive Disorientation Framing Deceptive Dynamics in Terms of Abductive Cognition
		11:30	13:00	Cofee Break
		13:00	13:30	Lying and Bullshit
		13:30	14:00	Lies, assertions and manipulations: between inferentialism and development
		14:00	14:30	Breaking the Tension in Self-Deception
		14:30	15:00	Cofee Break
		15:00	15:30	Perception of Lying by Indonesians Experimental deception: Science, performance, and reproducibility Using Ocular-Motor Methods to Detect Deception
		15:30	16:00	Pause
		16:00	16:30	Conference Party
		16:30	17:00	Brno City Tour
		30.11.2019	TBA	17:00
TBA	19:00		13:00	

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