Philosophers have long tried to conceptualise the difference between fictional and non-fictional discourse. No matter how the distinction is formulated, it is quite natural to assume that only non-fictional discourse is constrained by expectations of sincerity (you should only say what you believe) and accuracy (you should do your best to only say what is true). But are there similar constraints that apply to fictional discourse? Studying deceptive fiction can be helpful to answer this question. Clearly, fiction can be purposefully and effectively deceptive – both about the real world (as it may happen with inaccurate historical fiction) and about what happens in the fictional world of the story (as it happens with unreliable narrators). If deceptive fiction relies on the violation of some conversational expectations, understanding how fiction can deceive us can help us understand what kind of expectations underlie fictional discourse. This paper will review different ways in which fiction can be deceptive, to offer a tentative characterisation of the conversational expectations generated by fictional discourse.